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I. Introduction 
In 2011, an infant, whom I will call Gary,1 was born in New 
York.2 Gary was born in and lived in a rental apartment in New 
York with his mother and father for the first year of his life.3 The 
                                                                                                     
 1.  As the source for this introduction is a civil action on behalf of an 
anonymous child, a name has been given for narrative clarity. 
 2.  See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 92 F. Supp. 3d 53, 60 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“On 
August 1, 2011, Hernandez-Adams gave birth to plaintiff G.M.M. in her ground 
floor apartment.”).  
 3.  See id. at 56 (“Plaintiffs Niki Hernandez-Adams and her son G.M.M. 
(“plaintiffs”) are both currently Texas residents and former tenants of 490 
Macdonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11233.”).  
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young couple chose the apartment as a wonderful place to house 
themselves, their two dogs, and their expected child.4 Gary was 
developing well and could be found crawling around the home 
that he shared with his parents and their two dogs.5 During his 
first-year medical check-up, however, Gary’s doctor discovered 
that he had an exceptionally high blood-lead level of nine 
grams/deciliter.6 On the advice of Gary’s doctor, Gary’s mother 
had the apartment tested for lead paint.7 The test revealed 
concerning levels of lead-contaminated dust throughout the unit.8 
Approximately one month after learning the results of the lead 
paint test, Gary and his parents moved out of the apartment;  
Gary, however, did not escape the effects of the contamination.9 
An evaluation of Gary when he was three years old revealed 
numerous behavioral and cognitive issues.10 A licensed 
psychologist found “deficits in the areas of expressive language, 
attention and concentration, short-term memory and behavioral 
difficulties [that were] casually related to [Gary’s] high lead levels 
between the critical ages of 1–2.”11 The evaluation revealed 
                                                                                                     
 4.  See id. at 59 (“We needed a yard. We needed a garden. So that was 
primarily why we looked at that apartment. . . . We have two dogs. So we 
needed a backyard for them. . . . We were very happy and we loved [the] 
apartment. We liked the layout. We liked the location.” (citing Mendez June 
Dep. 15:3–5) (alterations in original)). 
 5.  See id. at 59–60 (describing G.M.M.’s first year of life in the 
apartment).  
 6.  See id. at 60 (noting G.M.M.’s blood-lead levels); CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, BLOOD LEAD LEVELS IN CHILDREN 1–2 (2015) 
(explaining that parents must be notified if a child has blood-lead levels of 5 
micrograms per deciliter, that 10 micrograms per deciliter is a level of concern, 
and that chelation therapy is recommended if the blood-lead levels are over 45 
micrograms per deciliter). 
 7.  See Kimpson, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 61 (describing the testing in G.M.M.’s 
apartment)). 
 8.  See id. (explaining that half of the samples taken contained 
lead-contaminated dust above permissible levels). 
 9.  See id. (noting that lead test results were given to Hernandez-Adams 
on September 12, 2012, and the family moved out of the apartment and to Texas 
in October 2012). 
 10.  See id. at 61–62 (noting that a neuropsychological evaluation 
administered on April 24, 2014, revealed “impairments and cognitive limitations 
secondary to lead poisoning”). 
 11.  Id. at 62.   
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various enduring problems such as Expressive Language 
Disorder, Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder, and 
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral issues.12 Gary’s parents 
brought a civil suit against the landlord.13 Gary was suing for 
direct medical damages from his ingestion of lead dust, as well as 
lost future earnings because of the reduction in his future 
prospects due to the cognitive and behavioral challenges the lead 
contamination caused.14  
Cases like Gary’s are common. The recent case of lead in the 
Flint, Michigan water supply serves as a stark reminder.15 When 
an individual is injured, the plaintiff seeks damages in part to 
make herself whole, or to put her in a position as if the injury had 
not occurred.16 Personal injury cases thus seek to fairly and 
accurately compensate a victim for the actual damages the 
tortfeasor caused.17 In many cases, the actual damage caused is 
uncertain.18 This is true, for example, where a child is injured 
and it is unclear where life would have taken her,19 where a 
                                                                                                     
 12.  See id. at 62 (describing G.M.M.’s difficulty communicating, focusing, 
learning, and functioning). 
 13.  See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(noting that G.M.M.’s mother filed the suit). 
 14.  See id. (“A critical factor in determining damages required ascertaining 
the infant’s prospects for obtaining postsecondary education degrees had he not 
suffered from lead poisoning.”).  
 15.  See Sara Ganim & Linh Tran, How Tap Water Became Toxic in Flint, 
Michigan, CNN (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/11/health/toxic-
tap-water-flint-michigan/ (last visited June 5, 2016) (discussing the lead-
poisoned tap water in Flint) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
see also infra Part V.C (explaining the lead contaminated water situation in 
Flint, Michigan, and how a statute could help manage the various claims). 
 16.  See United States v. Denver, 547 F.2d 1101, 1105 (10th Cir. 1977) 
(“[T]he fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured party, as 
nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in had it not been for the 
wrong of the other party.” (citation omitted)). 
 17.  See Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 16 (2d Cir. 
1996) (noting that a tortfeasor’s misconduct is irrelevant for calculating 
compensatory damages because such damages are meant only to compensate 
the plaintiff). 
 18.  See Clinchfield R.R. Co. v. Forbes, 417 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1966) (“[I]t has been said that testimony tending to establish the future earning 
capacity of any person is necessarily speculative.”). 
 19.  See, e.g., Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1572–73 (S.D. Ga. 
1996) (calculating damages to be paid to the estate a six-year-old child who was 
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plaintiff was in college at the time of injury,20 or where an 
employed plaintiff may or may not be promoted in the future.21 
Injuries often deprive individuals of future earning potential.22 
When there is a lack of evidence regarding current earnings, 
courts cannot be certain about future earnings.23 Even when an 
individual introduces evidence of current earnings, courts must 
make educated guesses about potential promotions, work-life 
expectancy, and other unknowns.24  
To assist in these projected future earnings, courts use U.S. 
Department of Labor lifetime earnings studies, Census Bureau 
statistics, and mortality and work-life expectancy tables.25 The 
                                                                                                     
killed in an automobile accident by examining the likelihood the child would 
attend college and speculating on life expectancy). 
 20.  See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reese, 425 P.2d 465, 467 (Okla. 
1967) (examining how damages should be calculated for a woman who “had been 
unable to return to school and complete her course of study in the operation of 
business machines”).  
 21.  See, e.g., Childs, 923 F. Supp. at 1574, 1576 (finding that a woman 
killed in a car accident “could have advanced into upper management in [her] 
company,” and that her damages should account for regular raises at her job).  
 22.  See Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983) (“Impairment of the capacity or power to work is an injury separate from 
the actual loss of earnings. . . . The plaintiff may recover even where she was not 
working and earned nothing.”).  
 23.  See Oliveri v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 849 F.2d 742, 745 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(“The admissibility of evidence regarding future earning capacity is within the 
wide discretion of the trial judge.”). 
 24.  See, e.g., Giza v. BNSF Ry. Co., 843 N.W.2d 713, 722–23 (Iowa 2014) 
(finding that generalized tables and evidence of typical retirement age can be 
presented to a jury). 
 25.  See, e.g., Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 
1996) (finding that an expert’s testimony was properly admitted where it was 
based on “accepted work-life tables published by the Department of Labor” for 
use in work-life expectancy calculation); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 
So. 2d 1269, 1276–77 (Miss. 2000) (“[W]e hold . . . where there is no past income 
upon which to base a calculation of projected future income, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the deceased child’s income would have been the 
equivalent of the national average as set forth by the United States Department 
of Labor.”); Jones v. Eppler, 266 P.2d 451, 456 (Okla. 1953) (“[T]he weight of 
authority is that standard life and annuity tables . . . are admissible in evidence 
in personal injury cases . . . of the earning capacity of the person negligently 
injured.”); Niles v. City of San Rafael, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733, 739 (Cal. App. 1974) 
(relying on a study of national average lifetime income the Department of Labor 
compiled in a case involving an eleven-year-old who was paralyzed).  
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Department of Labor lifetime earnings studies and Census 
Bureau statistics use factors such as race, ethnicity, and gender.26 
Economists and other experts often rely on such race-, ethnicity-, 
and gender-based statistics (minority-based statistics) in 
calculations of lost earning capacity.27 As one expert noted, 
experts are meant to assist a factfinder, and despite performing 
“thousands of lost income analyses . . . no one had ever asked him 
to provide race- and sex-neutral calculations in wrongful death 
cases.”28 In recent years, however, courts have provided 
minority-neutral jury instructions and required experts to utilize 
minority-neutral factors for determinations of lost future 
earnings.29 Scholarship has also examined whether courts should 
consider race, ethnicity, or gender for individual tort cases, 
                                                                                                     
 26.  See Race, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/topics/population/race.html (last visited June 5, 2016) 
(“The Census Bureau collects race data according to U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget guidelines, and these data are based on self-identification.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 27.  See, e.g., O’Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959) 
(explaining that a white male was entitled to have his life expectancy based on 
the average for white males, rather than life expectancy based on the general 
populace); In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, 462 F. Supp. 2d 360, 362–63 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that the victim would have provided monetary 
support to his parents for the remainder of their lives with a longer life 
expectancy for the mother based gender-based life expectancy tables); Athridge 
v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187, 1192–93 (D.D.C. 1996) (relying on statistical 
earnings of an average white male who attended college to determine the lost 
future earnings of a white high school male injured in a car accident).  
 28.  United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1315 (D. Utah 2004), 
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 29.  See United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1126–27 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(finding that the lower court acted correctly in eliminating minority-based 
statistics from consideration for restitution out of concern of fairness when the 
expert wished to utilize race- and gender-based statistics); Childs v. United 
States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1580 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (explaining that race-dependent 
statistical tables are less reliable and ignore individuals’ “respective 
backgrounds” and that race-neutral factors are a more reliable source for lost 
future income calculations); Wheeler Tarpey-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 
427, 455 (D.D.C. 1991) (rejecting the argument that income statistics for black 
men should be used for a half-black, half-white child, as “it would be 
inappropriate to incorporate current discrimination” into lost future earnings 
and instead using average earnings of all individuals), rev’d, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). 
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regardless of their reliability.30 One scholar has even argued that 
the use of minority-based statistics violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 This trend recently 
culminated in a federal court decision that found that the use of 
race- and ethnicity-based statistics is unconstitutional.32 
This Note examines the arguments for and against the use of 
minority-based statistics in future lost earnings determinations. 
The trend in recent years has been against the use of such 
statistics.33 While this Note opposes using minority-based 
statistics to calculate damages, it contends that their use is 
constitutional. In contrast to other scholarship on the issue, this 
Note argues that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not apply because experts’ use of minority-
based statistics does not constitute state action. Although a better 
argument arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the use of minority-based statistics34 does not 
                                                                                                     
 30.  See Laura Greenberg, Comment, Compensating the Lead Poisoned 
Child: Proposals for Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 429, 430 (2001) (arguing against “dependence on race-based 
statistics” because they “assume[] that race is and should be the primary 
determinant of individual achievement,” and arguing that courts should use 
race-neutral statistics and consider factors that “increase the likelihood of 
[children] overcoming adverse situations”); Sherri R. Lamb, Note, Toward 
Gender-Neutral Data for Adjudicating Lost Future Earning Damages: An 
Evidentiary Perspective, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 299, 299 (1996) (arguing for 
gender-neutral statistics where “there is no earning pattern on which to base as 
individualized determination of lost future earning potential”). 
 31.  See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and 
Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 77 (1994) (arguing that the use of race- and gender-
based data in tort cases constitutes state action that violates “the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection”); see generally JENNIFER B. WRIGGENS & MARTHA 
CHAMALLAS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 155–82 
(2010) (discussing the impact that race, gender, and ethnicity have had on tort 
law generally and on damage determinations). 
 32.  See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The 
use of race-based statistics to obtain a reduced damage award—which is now 
extended to the use of ethnicity-based statistics, to calculate future economic 
loss—is unconstitutional.”). 
 33.  See infra Part III (discussing emerging trends). 
 34.  See infra Part IV.C.1 (arguing that procedural due process is not 
violated because the applicability of minority-based statistics is fully 
adjudicated in a trial). 
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violate procedural due process.35 Their use does, however, deprive 
minorities and women of their autonomy and right to chart their 
own course in life, which arguably violates substantive due 
process.36 Nonetheless, the due process argument does not apply 
to minority-based statistics because there is no state action and 
substantive due process is a questionable doctrine.37 This Note 
proposes a federal statutory Fair Experts Act, similar to the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1964.38 A statutory framework limiting the kind of 
information experts may use provides a better and more feasible 
solution for excluding minority-based statistics from court cases.39 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed courts to combat 
discrimination against private individuals and regulated private 
conduct.40 This Note maintains that a Fair Experts Act will 
similarly combat problematic private conduct by experts in tort 
litigation.41 Finally, this Note applies the proposed Fair Experts 
                                                                                                     
 35.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due 
process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive 
individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 36.  See infra Part IV.C.2 (arguing that minority-based statistics fail to 
account for individual autonomy and potentially violate substantive due 
process). 
 37.  See infra Part IV.C.2 (explaining that the existence of substantive due 
process is questionable and due process is susceptible to state action concerns). 
 38.  Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 39.  See infra Part V.B (arguing for a Fair Experts Act). 
 40.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
[E]nforced the constitutional right to vote, conferred jurisdiction upon 
the district courts of the United States, provided injunctive relief 
against discrimination in public accommodations, authorized the 
Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in 
public facilities and public education, extended the Commission on 
Civil Rights, prevented discrimination in federally assisted programs, 
and established a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity.  
Civil Rights Act of 1964, THE NAT’L ARCHIVES CATALOG, 
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/299891 (last visited June 5, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 41.  See infra Part V.A (examining congressional power to regulate private 
conduct and its ability to enforce constitutional rights without depending on the 
Constitution). 
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Act to claims arising from tap water contamination in Flint, 
Michigan.42 
Part II examines the argument in favor of using 
minority-based statistics to calculate future lost earnings, case 
law, and the underlying principles supporting their use.43 Future 
earnings calculations are necessarily speculative—courts must 
help decide an unknown future, often with little information.44 
Allowing experts to use minority-based statistics allows a 
defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s evidence.45 Part III discusses 
emerging case law finding minority-based statistics unreliable.46 
This Part examines the arguments against minority-based 
statistics, including the effect of past inequality.47 Part III also 
discusses the arguments surrounding claims that minority-based 
statistics often fail to account for an individual’s ability to 
overcome and succeed past expectations.48 Part IV examines the 
arguments for a constitutional bar on the use of minority-based 
statistics in tort cases under the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.49 Part V offers a 
                                                                                                     
 42.  See infra Part V.C (applying Fair Experts Act to hypothetical plaintiff 
from Flint, Michigan, and explaining how traditional minority-based statistics 
would lead to unfair results). 
 43.  See infra Part II (explaining that principles underlying tort law, such 
as making plaintiff whole and holding tortfeasors accountable only for damages 
they inflicted, has shaped the use of minority-based statistics). 
 44.  See Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677 (Va. 1990) (“Estimates of 
damages based entirely upon statistics and assumptions are too remote and 
speculative . . . such evidence must be grounded upon facts specific to the 
individual whose loss is being calculated.”).  
 45.  See Giza v. BNSF Ry. Co., 843 N.W.2d 713, 732 (Iowa 2014) (explaining 
that a defendant would be “defenseless” if not allowed to present data based on 
typical retirement age). 
 46.  See infra Part III (noting a trend in case law over the past few decades 
to limit or eliminate the use of minority-based statistics). 
 47.  See infra Part III (explaining that minority-based statistics are often 
based on economic data that reflects biases and reinforce inequality). 
 48.  See Greenberg, supra note 30, at 430–31 (arguing that “experts should 
start from the optimistic assumption that children are, in fact, able to overcome 
obstacles that confront them”). 
 49.  See infra Part IV (examining arguments that minority-based statistics 
are unconstitutional and arguing that such arguments fail to consider state 
action and the adversarial nature of expert testimony). 
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statutory alternative to the constitutional bar.50 This Part argues 
that a federal statute limiting experts’ use of minority-based 
statistics is within Congress’s power and ensures fair and equal 
treatment of all individuals.51 
II. Experts Typically Use Minority-Based Statistics and the 
Underlying Principles of Tort Law Arguably Support Such Use 
Important and often conflicting goals govern tort law. On the 
one hand, a core purpose of tort law is to make a plaintiff whole 
by putting her in the same—or as close to the same—position as 
she was in before the injury, so far as money can.52 On the other 
hand, tort law requires that defendants pay only for damages 
that they actually caused.53  
One argument in favor of the use of minority-based statistics 
claims that these statistics ensure that a defendant compensates 
the plaintiff in the amount he would have actually earned absent 
the injury.54 The problem is that injured individuals often lack 
any evidence relating to current earnings or actual losses, either 
                                                                                                     
 50.  See infra Part V (arguing for a Fair Experts Act). 
 51.  See infra Part V (explaining that Congress has broad power under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate private individuals). 
 52.  See Jill Weber Lens, Honest Confusion: The Purpose of Compensatory 
Damages in Tort and Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 231, 235 
(2011) (“The aim of compensatory damages is to put the injured party ‘in a 
position substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which he would 
have occupied had no tort been committed,’ thus making the plaintiff whole.” 
(citations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 1979))). 
 53.  See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) 
(explaining that, without damage limits, individuals may face liability for “an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”).  
 54.  See, e.g., O’Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959) 
(explaining that, if the factfinder is using U.S. Life Tables to determine life 
expectancy for a white male, the life expectancy must be based on tables for 
white males only, rather than tables for the general population); see also August 
McCarthy, Note, The Lost Futures of Lead-Poisoned Children: Race-Based 
Damage Awards and the Limits of Constitutionality, 14 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. 
L.J. 75, 101 (2004) (“If the races of two plaintiffs make it more likely . . . that 
one plaintiff will earn less money in her lifetime than the other plaintiff, then 
this evidence is relevant.”). 
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because they have no work history, or because future prospects 
are uncertain.55 In one stark example, a woman, her unborn 
child, and her six year-old goddaughter were killed in a car 
accident.56 Whether the woman would have been promoted at her 
job,57 whether the six year-old would have gone to college,58 and 
virtually everything about the unborn child was unknown.59 As 
the court noted, “virtually all hypothesis and projections relating 
to [a] decedents’ [or injured individuals’] lives are necessarily 
speculative. No triers of fact, be they jurors or judges, can predict 
the future. The wisest of sages acknowledges this.”60  
To determine future lost earnings, courts sometimes depend 
on expert witnesses.61 Many times, the expert witness relies on 
Department of Labor statistics and work-life expectancy tables to 
determine the likely earnings and probable number of years an 
individual would work but for the injury.62 These statistics and 
tables often identify factors such as race, ethnicity, and gender, 
which experts may take into account.63 For example, numerous 
                                                                                                     
 55.  See Murray v. Sanford, 487 S.E.2d 135, 136 (Ga. App. 1997) (“When a 
permanent injury affects the injured party’s ability to work, only one 
compensation exists; but that compensation may involve three elements: the 
plaintiff’s diminished ability to labor, diminished earning capacity, and future 
lost earnings.”). 
 56.  See Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1572–74 (S.D. Ga. 1996) 
(describing the facts that lead to litigation). 
 57.  See id. at 1573–74 (examining Debra’s current job and the potential 
future prospects she could face). 
 58.  See id. at 1572–73 (noting that Ashleigh had some disadvantages but 
had shown aptitude in school). 
 59.  See id. at 1574 (explaining that the only known information about 
General was his mother, his gender, and that he was a healthy fetus). 
 60.  Id. at 1578.  
 61.  See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(considering the testimony of three experts to determine future economic 
prospects). 
 62.  See, e.g., id. (noting that the defendant’s attorney attempted to argue 
that the plaintiff was unlikely to obtain postsecondary education based on 
statistics showing that Hispanics make less money and attend college less 
often). 
 63.  See generally, e.g., BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S 
EARNINGS IN 2014 (Nov. 2015) [hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS], 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/cps/highlights-of-womens-earnings-in-2014.pdf  
(examining wages for women and men and including race, ethnicity, education, 
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jurisdictions have repeatedly upheld the use of Department of 
Labor statistical tables to determine work-life expectancy and 
estimated retirement age.64 Work-life expectancy concerns the 
amount of time a given individual is likely to have remained in 
the workforce.65 Courts have stated that statistical tables are 
relevant and admissible as an accepted and authoritative basis 
for determining work-life expectancy.66 The tort system therefore 
seeks to supplement the information about the plaintiff to ensure 
she is compensated for her loss through accurate data and 
realistic expectations.67 The work-life expectancy tables, however, 
                                                                                                     
and other factors as part of the analysis); Labor Force Statistics from the 
Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/tables.htm#charemp (last modified Mar. 24, 2016) (last 
visited June 5, 2016) (setting out monthly data on employment, including 
information about which race or ethnicity has employment) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., MEDIAN WEEKLY 
EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS BY DETAILED OCCUPATION 
AND SEX (2015), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.pdf (setting out statistics of 
earnings by men and women in various jobs).  
 64.  See Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(finding that an expert’s testimony regarding work-life expectancy was properly 
admitted because it was based on “widely accepted work-life tables published by 
the Department of Labor”); Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1167, 
1175 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (“Statistical charts, such as the mortality tables and work-
life expectancy tables prepared by the United States Department of Labor, 
compile averages and are often deemed authoritative, particularly in the 
absence of contradictory particularized evidence.”); Giza v. BNSF Ry. Co., 843 
N.W.2d 713, 723 (Iowa 2014) (“When considering lost earning capacity claims in 
other contexts, courts have found average retirement ages to be relevant and 
admissible. . . . [T]o determine when someone is likely to retire, we would want 
to look at when other people retire.”); Temple v. Murphy, 30 A.3d 992, 1003 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (concluding that in determining damages, a jury should 
consider all circumstances including “general population statistics, i.e. life 
expectancy and work life expectancy”). 
 65.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 81 (“Worklife expectancy is distinct 
from life expectancy. Worklife expectancy is derived from the working 
experience of all persons in the plaintiff’s gender or racial group; it incorporates 
rates of unemployment, both voluntary and involuntary, as well as expected 
retirement age.”). 
 66.  See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Pitts, 61 A.3d 767, 791 (Md. 2013) 
(“[S]tatistics discussing an individual’s projected date of retirement, or worklife 
expectancy, have been widely held to be relevant when future wage loss is at 
issue.”). 
 67.  See Weil v. Seltzer, 873 F.2d 1453, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[I]n a sense 
statistics are an attempt to take the speculation and conjecture out of the 
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result in disparate numbers based on race, ethnicity, and 
gender.68  
Because experts use the statistics for damage calculation, 
and courts admit the expert calculations based on the statistics, 
similarly situated individuals of different races or genders may 
face widely disparate damage awards.69 Work-life expectancy 
tables from 2011 found that an eighteen-year-old female with a 
high school diploma would have lifetime work experience 85% the 
amount of lifetime work experience of an eighteen-year-old male 
with a high school diploma.70 The argument for using these 
statistics—despite disparate numbers that do not account for an 
individual’s ability to overcome adversity—is that women 
typically do work fewer traditional hours and earn less than 
men.71 Further, the argument for using these statistics depends 
on the fact that Hispanics and African-Americans statistically do 
earn less than whites and Asians.72 In cases with no work history 
on which to rely, experts depend on statistics to supplement any 
                                                                                                     
damages equation.”). 
 68.  See, e.g., Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 385 (D.R.I. 1975) 
(awarding lower awards to a woman based on fewer years in the work force to 
account for child-rearing years); Morrison v. Alaska, 516 P.2d 402, 404 (Alaska 
1973) (concluding that an injured woman was likely to work for only five years 
and then marry and therefore was entitled to only nominal damages); see also 
Powell v. Parker, 303 S.E.2d 225, 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (using race-based 
statistics along with individualized factors to determine lost earning capacity for 
a wrongful death action of a seventeen-year-old male). 
 69.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 83–84 (noting an anecdote Chamallas 
heard from a colleague in which the projected lifetime income for a female 
college graduate was almost $600,000 less than that of her male counterpart). 
 70.  See Kurt V. Krueger & Frank Slesnick, Total Worklife Expectancy, 25 J. 
FORENSIC ECON. 51, 52 (2014) (explaining that the “current standard in 
determining worklife expectancy” shows an average worklife expectancy of 38.72 
years for an eighteen-year-old male and 32.91 years for an eighteen-year-old 
female). 
 71.  See generally HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 63, at 3–4 
(noting that women earn less than men in all racial categories and age 
categories, and that women tend to work fewer hours compared to their male 
counterparts). 
 72.  See id. at 4 (listing 2014 annual average weekly earnings based on race 
and gender, where Asians earn the most followed by whites, African Americans, 
and Hispanics/Latinos, and women of every race earn less than their male 
counterparts). 
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individualized information.73 Statistics can be particularly helpful 
in child injury cases when the child was injured or killed before 
he could establish aptitude or interests.74 Experts therefore use 
such statistics to help determine the actual amount needed to 
compensate the plaintiff—to the extent that money can 
compensate for a lost family member or grievous injury.75  
Second, tort law seeks to ensure that defendants are liable 
and pay for only the damage they actually cause and for the lost 
income the plaintiff could have actually received.76 There is a 
well-known tort doctrine known as the “thin skull rule.”77 This 
rule basically states that you must “take your victim as you find 
him,” regardless of what the average situation calls for.78 The 
inverse of the thin skull rule has neither a name nor a doctrine. It 
seems apparent, however, that a defendant would not be liable 
for damages that did not occur to an individual, regardless of 
                                                                                                     
 73.  See Temple v. Murphy, 30 A.3d 992, 1003 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) 
(noting that general population statistics is one piece of evidence a jury could 
consider to determine damages). 
 74.  See, e.g., Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1580 (S.D. Ga. 
1996) (noting the difficulty in determining earnings “in light of the fact that 
absolutely nothing is even known about [the unborn child’s] basic personal 
attributes, not to mention . . . academic capabilities, work ethic, ability to get 
along and gain rapport with people, etc.”). 
 75.  See McCarthy, supra note 54, at 93 (“The economist is trained to make 
such conclusions [about the likely future of a human being], to make sense out 
of the uncertainty of future earnings, and the discipline that trained her accepts 
race as an important indicator of future earnings.”). 
 76.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 47, topic 3, cmt. (b) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1979) (“It is not essential to recovery that the plaintiff should have been 
employed at the time of the accident, but his opportunities for employment are 
relevant in determining the amount that he probably could have earned.”). 
 77.  See Poole v. Copland, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 602, 604 (N.C. 1998) (“This rule 
provides that if the defendant’s misconduct amounts to a breach of duty to a 
person of ordinary susceptibility, he is liable for all damages suffered by the 
plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that these damages were unusually extensive 
because of a peculiar susceptibility of the plaintiff.”).  
 78.  See Fleckner v. Fleckner, 895 N.E.2d 896, 712, 715 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) 
(“[A] defendant who negligently inflicts injury on another takes the injured 
party as he finds her, which means it is not a defense that some other person of 
greater strength, constitution, or makeup might have been less injured, or 
differently injured, or quicker to recover.” (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted)). 
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what would happen to an “average individual.”79 As stated above, 
minority-based statistics attempt to refine and set a more 
accurate number for damages.80 
Both of these goals arguably support the use of minority-
based statistics.81 Both rely on the fundamental preference of 
individualized determinations or, as one scholar describes, liberty 
over equality.82 Adjudication judges and determines individual 
outcomes rather than equivalent outcomes.83 The Supreme Court 
has expressed a desire for liberty over equality in adjudication.84 
While equality may be a valid goal, the Court has expressed the 
opinion that individual adjudication is preferable, even where 
nearly identical facts could lead to different outcomes and 
duplicative litigation.85  
Alexandra Lahav examined the struggle between liberty and 
equality in the context of mass tort actions and argued that 
                                                                                                     
 79.  This principle follows from a similar general principle that tort liability 
must be limited and cannot be infinite. See Right v. Breen, 890 A.2d 1287, 1290 
(Conn. 2006) (explaining that a plaintiff must show defendant caused actual 
harm to recover damages). 
 80.  See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (noting the uncertainty 
inherent in determining lost future earnings for an injured child, and that 
experts use minority-based statistics to supplement limited facts). 
 81.  See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text (explaining the argument 
that minority-based statistics represent actual people and encourage accurate 
data, compensating the plaintiff for actual damage, and holding the defendant 
responsible for the harm actually caused). 
 82.  See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 571, 572–73 (2012) (“Liberty in civil litigation is summed up as deep rooted 
historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court. Equality is 
embodied in the common law principle that like cases should be treated alike.” 
(citations omitted)).  
 83.  See id. at 572–73 (“[O]ur criminal justice system tolerates a great deal 
of inconsistency in outcomes. Study after study has shown that both jurors and 
legal professionals assess damages inconsistently in tort cases.”). 
 84.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) 
(finding that rights cannot be abridged, modified, or enlarged, and so a class 
could not be certified because individualized determinations and defenses to 
individual claims require individualized proceedings, regardless of how 
presumptively valid claims were). 
 85.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 902–04 (2008) (rejecting the 
defendant’s theory that the public at large was represented in the suit despite 
potential “limitless” or repetitive litigation because relief is meant to benefit 
individuals).  
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consistency of results is a beneficial goal.86 Lahav explains that 
inconsistency of results in tort cases is hard to examine because 
of the lack of empirical evidence and how the method of valuation 
is neither agreed upon nor disclosed.87 The method of valuation is 
difficult to fully ascertain in future lost earning calculations 
because experts have discretion, so long as their methods meet 
evidentiary requirements.88 Lahav also noted that attempting to 
attain equality in damage calculations begs the question of what 
makes different cases different, but did not examine how the use 
of minority-based statistics affects liberty and equality.89 For lost 
future earnings calculations in cases like Gary’s, where there is 
little current evidence on which to base damages, it can be 
difficult to ascertain what differences matter.90 If the goal of 
equality is to treat like cases alike, courts should arguably use 
differences such as race, gender, or socioeconomic categories. As 
Lahav notes, “[t]he adjudicator ought to use only legally relevant 
variables to determine which members of the plaintiff population 
are alike.”91  
Minority-based tables are arguably legally relevant.92 The 
idea that liberty is preferred over equality thus offers an 
                                                                                                     
 86.  See generally Lahav, supra note 82 (examining how the traditional 
preference for individual adjudication is losing traction in lower courts in favor 
of equal outcomes for mass court cases through trial by formula). 
 87.  See id. at 589 
First, there is no agreed-upon metric for measuring or monetizing 
injury in cases. Second, the tort system is a complex, private, and 
largely hidden system of compensation. . . . The third problem . . . is a 
result of the interaction of the first two problems. . . . Monetizing 
injuries based on past outcome also produces a static value. 
 88.  See Phillips v. Indus. Mach., 597 N.W.2d 377, 392–93 (Neb. 1999) 
(explaining that an expert can use external data so long as it is accepted and 
“meets minimum standards of reliability”).  
 89.  See Lahav, supra note 82, at 594–95 (“Some formal philosophers argue 
that formal equality—the principle that like cases be treated alike—is really an 
empty concept because it begs the key question of which cases are alike.”).  
 90.  See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(discussing expert methodology and reliance on family history and neighborhood 
and ethnicity). 
 91.  Lahav, supra note 82, at 595. 
 92.  See Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(allowing expert testimony based on Department of Labor work-life tables as 
based on a “properly laid foundation”). 
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argument for the use of minority-based statistics by encouraging 
damage determinations based on a plaintiff’s personal 
characteristics.93 Minority-based statistics can potentially help an 
expert determine more accurate figures for damages.94 As one 
author points out, “[i]f non-white workers tend to earn less than 
white workers, then this problem extends far beyond the scope of 
a trial court.”95 Although utilizing statistics based on race, 
ethnicity, and gender can cause unfairly disparate amounts, 
experts are meant to assist factfinders in deciding uncertain 
damages.96 Because damage awards are meant to compensate the 
plaintiff in a close approximation of actual damages on an 
individual basis, experts must be able to utilize relevant available 
data.97  
In recent years, the use of minority-based statistics has come 
under attack as both unreliable and, in one case, 
unconstitutional.98 Despite the recent attacks, experts and courts 
continue to use them to determine lost future earnings.99 The 
vocational tables experts use to determine worklife expectancy for 
disabled persons “produce worklife expectancy values for men 
and women at various levels of education from the ages of sixteen 
                                                                                                     
 93.  See McCarthy, supra note 54, at 94–95 (“The very uncertainty of future 
earning the critics of race-based damage awards decry actually weighs in favor 
of admitting expert testimony concerning every available indicator, including 
race.”). 
 94.  See id. at 95 (“We are after the truth, yes, but it is a judicial truth, 
tempered by the hard realities of the world in which we live.”). 
 95.  Id.  
 96.  See Ewing v. Esterholt, 684 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Mont. 1984) (“To reduce 
the inherent uncertainty of future damages, this Court has allowed testimony 
from various economic experts and the use of mortality and actuarial tables to 
aid jury determinations.” (citing Krohmer v. Dahl, 402 P.2d 979, 981 (Mont. 
1965))). 
 97.  See McCarthy, supra note 54, at 94 (arguing that the independence of 
the jury is served through allowing experts to offer evidence with any and all 
relevant data). 
 98.  See infra Part III (discussing the constitutional argument set forth by 
the Eastern District of New York). 
 99.  See McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“Despite the 2000 census’ more detailed self-categorization system, 
demographic studies that use pre-2000 census data continue to define ‘race’ by 
using the 1977 [Office of Management and Budget] directive.”). 
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through seventy-five.”100 As long as the Department of Labor and 
Census Bureau statistics rely on race and ethnicity as factors, 
experts who rely on them will be using minority-based 
statistics.101 Thus, experts continue to rely on explicitly gender- 
and race-based tables.102 
III. Emerging Case Law Against Minority-Based Statistical 
Tables 
In recent years, many courts have found minority-based 
statistics unreliable but declined to consider the constitutionality 
question.103 Some courts have found that worklife and lifetime 
earning determinations based on minority-based tables fails to 
meet standards of evidence.104 The argument is that statistical 
tables do not provide “sufficient facts or data” upon which to 
determine damages.105 Other courts have found that 
                                                                                                     
 100.  ANDREW SUM, ISHWAR KHATIWADA & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CTR. FOR 
LABOR MKT. STUDIES, REPLICATING THE GAMBOA GIBSON WORKLIFE TABLES 2 
(2010). But see James W. Bryan & E. Taylor Stukes, Debunking Lost Future 
Earnings Damages, THE TRANSP. LAWYER, Feb. 2011, at 25 (noting that Gamboa 
tables have been found unreliable and urging lawyers to be on the lookout for an 
expert’s use of such tables). 
 101.  See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BULBICK, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 479 (2d ed. 2015) (explaining that projections often use minority-based 
statistics, and despite concerns the use of the tables can ensure accuracy). 
 102.  See Sara A. Ford, Trial Talk: The Myth of Flawed “Methodology”, 
GREATER LOUISVILLE METRO ATT’Y AT L. MAG., July/Aug. 2011, at 14 (“The role of 
an expert in the courtroom is to aid the trier of fact in decision-making. 
Demographic data that describes a particular population are helpful in the 
decision-making process.”).  
 103.  See, e.g., Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 167 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(finding that using sex-based work-life tables is suspect and there is no 
requirement to use them); see also supra note 29 (listing cases that have refused 
to use minority-based statistics because of concerns about fairness and 
unreliability).  
 104.  See, e.g., Rebelwood Apartments RP, LP v. English, 48 So. 3d 483, 494 
(Miss. 2010) (arguing that using national-average and statistical data for 
earnings calculations fails the Daubert standard by not being based on sufficient 
facts or data). 
 105.  See id. at 496 (concluding that testimony of an expert relying on 
statistical tables “fails the requirement that it be based on sufficient facts or 
data”); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert . . . 
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: . . . the testimony is based 
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minority-based statistics are unreliable because they fail to 
account for individual potential.106 One scholar has argued for 
adoption of “resiliency theory,” which embraces the idea that 
“children living under extreme conditions (such as poverty) can 
rise far beyond what is expected of them.”107 Finally, some 
scholars have noted that minority-based statistics are both 
unreliable and inadvisable because using such statistics 
reinforces current discrimination and disparity.108 
A. Judge Weinstein and the Eastern District of New York’s 
Constitutional Argument 
In the past few years, these findings have culminated in the 
work of the well-respected Judge Weinstein109 in the U.S. District 
for the Eastern District of New York.110 Judge Weinstein took 
claims of unreliability one step further and concluded that the 
use of minority-based statistics violates the Constitution.111 This 
                                                                                                     
on sufficient facts or data.”). 
 106.  See, e.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 So. 2d 1269, 1276–77 
(Miss. 2000) (“Who is to say that a child from the most impoverished part of the 
state or with extremely poor parents has less of a future earnings potential than 
a child from the wealthiest part of the state with wealthy parents?”). 
 107.  Greenberg, supra note 30, at 456.  
 108.  See Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities 
in Personal Injury Claims Through Female-Specific Contingencies, 49 MCGILL 
L.J. 309, 314 (2004) (explaining that the use of gender-based statistics 
“perpetuates historical inequities” by reinforcing past and current 
discrimination); see also WRIGGENS & CHAMALLAS, supra note 31, at 159 (noting 
that past discrimination can result in lower damage determinations, for 
example, “[i]f black men have been incarcerated at a much higher rate than 
white men, resulting in lower labor-force participation rates for black men, race-
based worklife estimates predict that they will continue to work fewer years 
than whites”). 
 109.  See Deirdre M. Smith, The Disordered and Discredited Plaintiff: 
Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Litigation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 821 (2010) 
(noting that Judge Weinstein is “unquestionably the most respected 
contemporary jurist on the law of evidence”). 
 110.  See infra notes 115–126 and accompanying text (discussing McMillan v. 
City of New York 253 F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)), and infra notes 133–142 and 
accompanying text (discussing G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015)). 
 111.  See Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 129 (“[T]he specific characteristics of 
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conclusion has led to some excitement over the potential 
ramifications.112 The Eastern District of New York first found 
that the use of race-based life expectancy tables is 
unconstitutional.113 Later, the court extended this finding to 
gender- and ethnicity-based statistics of lifetime earnings.114  
1. McMillan v. City of New York 
In 2008, McMillan v. City of New York115 concluded that it is 
impermissible to utilize race-based statistics because race is an 
illusory statistic for life expectancy determinations.116 McMillan 
concerned a male African-American plaintiff who was injured in a 
ferryboat crash.117 To calculate the plaintiff’s damages, the court 
had to determine his expected life expectancy.118 The court found 
that life expectancy rates based on race were unreliable and 
                                                                                                     
the child and his family, rather than the characterization of the child as a 
member of a particular ethnic group must be used in determining damages. The 
ruling [is] based on the same constitutional and other factors relied upon in 
[McMillan, 253 F.R.D. 247].”). 
 112.  Christopher D. Barraza, Recent Decision Rejects Ethnicity as a Factor 
for Determining Future Lost Earning, LEXOLOGY: PROD. LIAB. MONITOR (Aug. 12, 
2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b5be833c-5de4-4196-ad4c-
e191043d0ee9 (last visited June 5, 2016) (“[G]iven the prominence of Judge 
Weinstein . . . it is conceivable that other courts may follow Kimpson in 
instances where ethnicity is used to challenge calculations of future lost 
earnings in tort cases.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 113.  See McMillan, 253 F.R.D. at 255–56 (finding experts’ use of race-based 
life expectancy table is state action that violates the plaintiff’s equal protection 
and due process rights) 
 114.  See Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 129 (finding experts’ use of 
ethnicity-based statistics to determine future earnings is state action that 
violates the plaintiff’s equal protection and due process rights). 
 115.  253 F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  
 116.  See id. at 250 (explaining that race is a socially constructed 
designation, and the main predictor of life expectancy is socioeconomic status). 
 117.  See id. at 248 (“James McMillan, the claimant, was rendered a 
quadriplegic in the crash of a ferryboat operated negligently by the City of New 
York.”). 
 118.  See id. at 248–49 (noting that the “critical factor” of life expectancy 
needed to be put before the jury, and there was a dispute on whether experts 
could use life expectancy tables based on race). 
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raised constitutional issues.119 McMillan based this finding in 
large part on the argument that race is an illusory statistic—
meaning that race is socially constructed and not a biological 
characteristic.120 The argument noted that “the reality [is] that 
the diversity of human biology has little in common with socially 
constructed ‘racial’ categories.”121 Further, life expectancy rates 
typically attributable to race are actually based on socioeconomic 
status.122 Thus, Judge Weinstein concluded that race-based 
statistics are inherently unreliable.123  
The court also argued that the use of race-based statistics 
was discriminatory and constitutionally questionable.124 It noted 
that “[b]y allowing use of ‘race’-based statistics, a court would be 
creating arbitrary and irrational state action.”125 McMillan found 
that “[j]udicial reliance on ‘racial’ classifications constitutes state 
action.”126 The court argued that the admission of expert 
testimony that relies on race-based life expectancy tables 
constitutes state action by the judge who failed to give equal 
protection to the plaintiff.127 In doing so, Judge Weinstein relied 
heavily on the burdens that these “arbitrary” statistics place on 
                                                                                                     
 119.  See id. at 248 (finding that “the unreliability of ‘race’ as a predictor of 
life expectancy as well as normative constitutional requirements of equal 
treatment and due process support” using race neutral life expectancy tables). 
 120.  See id. at 249–50 (“DNA technology finds little variation among ‘races’ 
(humans are genetically 99.9% identical), and it is difficult to pinpoint any 
‘racial identity’ of an individual through his or her genes.”). 
 121.  Id. at 250. 
 122.  See id. at 252 (noting that, in controlled studies that account only for 
socioeconomic status, life expectancy rates for African-Americans are similar or 
identical to Caucasians). 
 123.  See id. at 251 (“[T]he tables frequently employed by courts in 
determining tort damages fail to account for the nuanced reality of ‘racial’ 
heritage in the United States today.”). 
 124.  See id. at 255–56 (arguing that using race-based statistics classifies 
individuals according to “suspect categories,” and that a court is, in essence, 
endorsing their use constituting arbitrary state action).  
 125.  Id. at 256.  
 126.  Id. at 255. 
 127.  See id. (“Equal Protection in this context demands that the claimant 
not be subjected to a disadvantageous life expectancy estimate solely on the 
basis of a ‘racial’ classification.”). 
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minorities.128 These burdens, the argument goes, are the result of 
arbitrary discriminatory state action based on a racial 
classification and their admission fails strict scrutiny.129 
Further, the court also argued that compensation in a tort 
case is “in effect a property right” that requires due process.130 
When the government takes property, an individual is entitled to 
due process of the law.131 Because a court’s admission of evidence 
based on minority-based tables is arbitrary state action, Judge 
Weinstein argued it is a due process violation.132 McMillan laid 
the groundwork for the finding of a constitutional violation 
whenever a judge admits expert testimony relying on any 
minority-based statistics in its later case G.M.M. v. Kimpson.133  
2. G.M.M. v. Kimpson 
G.M.M. v. Kimpson involved a lead poisoned child—referred 
to in the introduction as Gary.134 Gary’s mother brought suit and 
                                                                                                     
 128.  See id. at 256 (“The legal system does not work fairly and with due 
process if one class of litigants is unduly burdened in litigation through the 
application of inappropriate ‘race’-based statistics.”). 
 129.  See id. at 255 (explaining that, where state action is based upon racial 
classifications, the suspect nature of the racial class triggers strict scrutiny, 
which is not met in this case). 
 130.  Id.; see also infra Part IV.C.1 (exploring the argument that an 
individual has a property interest in tort compensation) 
 131.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due 
process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive 
individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 132.  See McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“Were the court to apply an ill-founded assumption, automatically burdening 
on ‘racial’ grounds a class of litigants who seek compensation, there would be a 
denial of due process.”). 
 133.  See 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that relying on 
illusory minority-based statistics results in “arbitrary and irrational state 
action” which constitutes a “denial of due process”); see also Chamallas, supra 
note 31, at 77 (“A finding of sufficient state action is required . . . before any 
constitutional challenge can be made to the use of race-based or gender-based 
data in tort litigation.”).  
 134.  See Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d, at 131 (describing plaintiff’s claims); see 
also supra notes 1–14 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Kimpson).    
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won a claim for damages in a jury trial.135 In his opinion 
discussing the admissibility of the expert testimony, Judge 
Weinstein built on McMillan and concluded that the use of all 
minority-based statistics is unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.136  
At the time of trial, the court identified Gary as a Hispanic 
male.137 The defendant’s expert, Dr. Lentz, relied on 
ethnicity-based statistics to claim future economic loss of 
earnings that were lower than the plaintiffs’ expert’s 
estimation.138 Dr. Lentz argued that, because Hispanics are 
statistically less likely to earn postsecondary degrees, it was 
improbable that Gary would do so.139 The plaintiffs pointed out 
that Gary’s mother held a Master of Fine Arts, and Gary’s father 
had a baccalaureate degree, and so he would have been likely to 
obtain a postsecondary degree.140 The court rejected the 
defendant expert’s testimony, concluding that it is 
unconstitutional to consider ethnicity-based statistics rather than 
the individual characteristics of the plaintiff.141 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court rejected “a principle in awarding damages 
‘that reflect subtle but pervasive racism and classism.’”142  
                                                                                                     
 135.  See id. at 130–31 (“After a two-week trial with extensive expert 
testimony, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on three 
theories . . . .”). 
 136. See id. at 152 (finding that judicial reliance on minority-based statistics 
results in discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and constitutes 
“arbitrary and irrational state action” in violation of the Due Process Clause).  
 137.  Id. at 128–29. 
 138.  See id. at 135 (noting that the defendant’s expert Dr. Lentz is a forensic 
economist who based his calculations on G.M.M.’s status as Hispanic). 
 139.  See id. at 129 (“[D]efendant’s attorney attempted to show, through the 
use of expert economic testimony, statistics and cross-examination of the 
plaintiffs’ experts, that because the child was ‘Hispanic,’ his likelihood of 
obtaining a Bachelor, Master, or Doctoral degree, and any corresponding 
elevated income, was improbable.”). 
 140.  See id. at 129 (finding that given G.M.M.’s “specific family background,” 
there was a very high probability he would have earned a secondary degree 
regardless of statistics based on ethnicity).  
 141.  See id. at 132–33 (quoting the court’s instruction to the defendant’s 
expert witness that the expert cannot use general ethnicity-based statistics to 
calculate lost future earnings). 
 142.  Id. at 154 (quoting Greenberg, supra note 30, at 457).   
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Kimpson expanded McMillan by concluding that 
ethnicity-based statistics, as well as race-based statistics, violate 
the Constitution.143 Even under Kimpson’s broad constitutional 
argument, questions remain on whether gender- or other 
minority-based statistics besides race or ethnicity also would be 
found unconstitutional.144 Judge Weinstein nonetheless expressed 
strongly that “[t]he state itself discriminates by enforcing a 
substantive rule of discrimination—damages—based on race or 
ethnicity in reducing damages in tort cases. Such an illegal 
standard cannot be enforced by the courts.”145 
IV. The Constitutional Argument 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
provides: 
 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the state in which they reside. No state 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”146  
This section contains guarantees of procedural due process,147 
substantive due process,148 and equal protection.149 Together 
                                                                                                     
 143.  See id. at 148–49 (“It is unconstitutional in a tort trial to premise 
projected societal and educational achievements on race or ethnicity to reduce 
tort damages.”). 
 144.  See, e.g., Adjin-Tettey, supra note 108, at 311 (arguing that using 
gender-based statistics in awards for tort damages reinforces the 
marginalization of women by returning female plaintiffs to the “status quo 
ante”). 
 145.  G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 146.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 147.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due 
process imposes certain constraints on governmental decisions which deprive 
individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 148.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (“The Due 
Process clause guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it protects 
includes more than the absence of physical restraint.”). 
 149.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (explaining that the Equal 
 
230 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 206 (2016) 
these sections protect individual rights.150 The Fourteenth 
Amendment, however, “erects no shield against merely private 
conduct,”151 but only against state action.152  
A. State Action and the Use of Minority-Based Statistics 
The Supreme Court has found that before any action may be 
brought or rights may be protected, the Fourteenth 
Amendment—like other constitutional amendments—has the 
“threshold requirement” of state action.153 As one scholar noted: 
“The text of the original Constitution unambiguously establishes 
that it is a law governing government, not individuals.”154 Such a 
restriction serves various purposes. One argument is that the 
state action doctrine not only protects a zone of private autonomy, 
but also protects state sovereignty.155 Another argument is that 
the state action doctrine does not protect individuals’ zones of 
interest, but is necessary for a democracy as a limitation on the 
Fourteenth Amendment.156 The Supreme Court has sometimes 
                                                                                                     
Protection clause requires equal treatment under the law and no “arbitrary and 
invidious discrimination”). 
 150.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (“[T]he 
guarantees of due process, though having their roots in Magna Carta’s ‘per 
legem terrae’ and considered as procedural safeguards ‘against executive 
usurpation and tyranny,’ have in this country ‘become bulwarks also against 
arbitrary legislation.’” (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting))). 
 151.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
 152.  See id. (“[T]he action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.”). 
 153.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (“Foremost 
among these limitations is the time-honored principle that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, by its terms, prohibits only state action.”). 
 154.  Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of 
Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1387 (2006). 
 155.  See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (“Careful 
adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement preserves an area of individual 
freedom by limiting the reach of individual freedom by limiting the reach of 
federal law and federal judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State . . . 
responsibility for which they cannot fairly be blamed.”). 
 156.  See Huhn, supra note 153, at 1381–82 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
has misconstrued the doctrine because individuals have no constitutional right 
to violate others’ fundamental rights). 
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expanded the definition of what constitutes a state act or actor—
there is a public function exception157 and an entanglement 
exception.158 Despite debates over the purpose of the state action 
doctrine and its exceptions, the doctrine continues to be invoked 
and has been reaffirmed in recent years.159 Experts’ and courts’ 
use of minority-based statistics must, therefore, constitute state 
action to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.160 
Kimpson found that using ethnicity-based tables violated the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.161 The court argued that the use of minority-based 
statistics constitutes “arbitrary and irrational state action” but 
did not provide a solid basis for that finding.162 The court stated 
that “[t]he state itself discriminates by enforcing a substantive 
rule of discrimination—damages—based on race or ethnicity in 
reducing damages in tort cases.”163 This claim was supported only 
by an article by Martha Chamallas,164 which reasoned that a 
                                                                                                     
 157.  See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87–88 (1980) 
(concluding that a shopping center could not prevent individuals from passing 
out pamphlets and seeking signatures because the public nature of the shopping 
center prevents it from being considered private in the sense that most private 
businesses are).  
 158.  See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (noting that claims are not barred where 
private and government actors and acts are entangled, which can be shown if: 
(1) the deprivation is caused by a “right or privilege created by the state;” and 
(2) the individual causing the deprivation can be said to be a state actor). 
 159.  See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721, 730 (2012) 
(upholding state action requirement in pretrial screening of eyewitness 
statements, and holding that the due process clause does not require such 
screening where there is no police—and no state—action); see also Christopher 
W. Schmidt, The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 767, 770 (2010) (explaining that even during the civil rights era, neither the 
Supreme Court nor Congress redefined the Fourteenth Amendment by 
removing the state action doctrine). 
 160.  See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992) (“Where 
resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does not 
have constitutional implications.”). 
 161.  See supra notes 140–145 and accompanying text (discussing Kimpson). 
 162.  G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 163.  Id. at 149.  
 164.  Unsupported opinions do not necessarily translate to incorrect opinions. 
Ours is a system of common law, however, and as such courts should be hesitant 
to adopt rules with little or no support.   
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court admitting expert testimony based on minority-based tables 
constitutes state action by endorsing the use of minority-based 
statistics.165 Chamallas relied on Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Company166 to contend that use of race-based classifications in 
civil litigation constitutes state action.167 Chamallas argued that 
the use of expert testimony rises to the level of state action by 
providing a means for the jury to determine the outcome.168  
In Edmonson, the plaintiff was injured while working 
construction when the defendant’s truck rolled into him.169 After 
bringing suit, “Edmonson invoked his Sixth Amendment right to 
a trial by jury.”170 Edmonson (the plaintiff) was a black man, and 
during voir dire the defendant company used peremptory strikes 
to remove the two black veniremen.171 Edmonson sought to 
challenge the peremptory strikes on the ground that they were 
based on race, but the district court denied his request.172 A 
divided panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, but 
then subsequently affirmed en banc.173 
On appeal from the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court held 
that “the exercise of peremptory challenges by the defendant in 
                                                                                                     
 165.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 105 (“My principal argument for 
finding state action is that it is impossible to separate the use of the statistics 
from the underlying legal standard in the case.”). 
 166.  See 500 U.S. 614, 628–29 (1991) (finding that private litigants’ use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of race violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 167.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 106–11 (arguing that using of race-
based statistics in tort actions is factually similar to using peremptory 
challenges in civil cases).  
 168.  See id. at 109 (“[T]he objective of expert testimony is to help the jury 
apply the law to the facts, a process that is intricately connected to choice of the 
governing legal standard.”). 
 169.  See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616 (describing plaintiff’s injuries). 
 170.  Id.  
 171.  See id. at 616–17 (noting that Leesville used “two of its three 
peremptory challenges to remove black persons from the prospective jury”). 
 172.  See id. at 617 (explaining that Edmonson requested a race-neutral 
explanation according to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), but district 
court denied the request, stating that Batson does not apply to civil 
proceedings). 
 173.  See id. (“A divided en banc panel affirmed . . . holding that a private 
litigant in a civil case can exercise peremptory challenges without accountability 
for alleged racial classifications.”). 
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the District Court was pursuant to a course of state action.”174 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that the state 
action doctrine consists of two questions: “first whether the 
claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a 
right or privilege having its source in state authority . . . and 
second whether the private party charged with the deprivation 
could be described in all fairness as a state actor.”175  
1. Experts’ Use of Minority-Based Statistics Is Not Sourced from 
State Authority Because Experts Are Independent and Jurors Are 
Not Required to Accept the Testimony. 
Kennedy wrote that the first question was obvious—
peremptory strikes exist only in a court of law and arise only 
under statutory and court authority.176 Chamallas noted that this 
question is not so clearly answered when experts use 
minority-based statistics given the numerous uses of economic 
projections outside the courtroom, for example, negotiations or 
other financial transactions.177 She argued, however, that experts’ 
testimony “refin[es] the legal standard for damages” and thus 
“has its source in state authority.”178 While this argument has 
some merit, it ignores the true nature of the Edmonson inquiry. 
As Edmonson notes, “[w]ithout its authorization, granted by an 
Act of Congress itself, [the defendant] would not have been able 
to engage in the alleged discriminatory acts.”179 The court 
emphasized the express authorization required by the 
government inherent in peremptory strikes, as well as the 
                                                                                                     
 174.  Id. at 622. 
 175.  Id. at 620 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939–42 
(1982)). 
 176.  See id. at 620–21 (finding that peremptory challenges do not arise 
because of the Constitution, but because of common law tradition and statutory 
authority, and that the defendants would not be able to exercise peremptory 
challenges if not for a statute). 
 177.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 107 (explaining that the first 
Edmonson inquiry is more difficult when considering an expert’s testimony). 
 178.  Id.  
 179.  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991). 
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historical nature of governmental endorsement.180 Expert 
opinions have neither exclusive nor historic government 
endorsement.181  
Chamallas also argued that admission of expert testimony “is 
accomplished through state authorization of courtroom 
procedures and direct involvement of the trial judge. Once so 
treated, the testimony should no longer be regarded as private, 
simply because the state did not dictate the content of the 
testimony nor pay the witness the expenses . . .”182 Through 
sanctioning the testimony and admitting the witness as an 
expert, so the argument goes, the court is turning the private 
witness into a state actor.183  
Expert testimony, however, does not have to be considered by 
the state because the jury can disregard what an expert offers.184 
While the objective of expert testimony is to assist the jury, it is 
quite different to say this testimony constitutes state action. 
Further, outlandish consequences can result if state action arises 
because the judge allowed an expert to use minority-based 
statistics, for example, “to declare the practice of admitting 
expert testimony unconstitutional solely on the basis that the 
judge does not approve of the content of the testimony would in 
                                                                                                     
 180.  See id. at 620–21 (explaining that peremptory challenges only exist 
when the government allows them, and there is a long history of “legislative 
authorizations, as well as limitations . . . [that] date back as far as the founding 
of the Republic”).  
 181.  For example, Chamallas conceded that experts are often used for 
purposes completely separate from the courtroom. See Chamallas, supra note 
31, at 107 (noting that experts are used for settlement and financial 
transactions); see also Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations 
Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40–41 (1901) (explaining that 
courts historically used experts in a variety of ways: by selecting jurors 
“especially fitted” to the issues; by calling individuals with “skilled knowledge” 
and adopting the findings; and finally more recently calling individuals directly 
before the jury). 
 182.  Chamallas, supra note 31, at 107–08. 
 183.  See id. (arguing that the “special status” the court gives the expert 
“carries unusual weight” that private actors do not possess). 
 184.  See Temple v. Murphy, 30 A.3d 992, 1003 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2011) 
(“The jury could consider the totality of the evidence, including Mr. Murphy’s 
age, health, employment, financial situation, and general population statistics, 
i.e., life expectancy and work life expectancy, to determine amount of lost 
support.”). 
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effect overrule Daubert and the substantial line of cases that have 
developed the Court’s expert testimony doctrine.”185 The idea that 
an expert is a state actor simply because a judge allows the 
testimony is hard to fathom.186 The expert’s authority also is not 
derived from the judge’s endorsement but from her knowledge of 
the relevant field and her ability to meet evidentiary 
requirements.187 Although a court must qualify an expert, “a 
witness does not qualify as an expert if [her] background is so 
limited that there is no reasonable expectation the witness can 
assist the trier of fact.”188 Because the knowledge required to be 
an expert is not derived from the court, the expert does not have 
“its source in state authority.”189 
2. Experts Are Not State Actors 
Under the second question—whether the private actor can 
fairly be considered a state actor—the Edmonson Court noted 
three factors: (1) how much the actor “relies on governmental 
assistance”; (2) is the actor “performing a traditional 
governmental function; and (3) is the injury uniquely aggravated 
by the “governmental authority.”190  
a. Governmental Assistance Is Not Necessary for Experts 
In examining the amount of governmental assistance, the 
Court explained that the system of juror selection—which 
                                                                                                     
 185.  McCarthy, supra note 54, at 101. 
 186.  See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (“[Holding] 
that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative of the 
Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or 
service from the State . . . would utterly emasculate the distinction between 
private as distinguished from state conduct.”). 
 187.  Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, an expert witness 
must be qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” FED. 
R. EVID. 702. 
 188.  29 WRIGHT & GOLD, FED. PRAC. & PROCEDURE: EVID. § 6265 (1997). 
 189.  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991). 
 190.  See id. at 621–22 (noting that the second Lugar prong is a fact-bound 
inquiry that contains “certain principles of general application”). 
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includes peremptory strikes—depends extensively upon the state 
and “could not exist” without the governments’ participation.191 
As the Court noted: 
[E]ach district court in the federal system must adopt a plan 
for locating and summoning to the court eligible prospective 
jurors. . . . This plan, as with all other trial court procedures, 
must implement statutory policies of random juror selection from 
a fair cross section of the community, . . . and non-exclusion on 
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic 
status. . . . Statutes prescribe many of the details of the jury 
plan . . . .192 
The Court also explained that a court tightly controls the 
entire voir dire process.193 Edmonson emphasized that a court 
participates directly in “enforcing a discriminatory peremptory 
challenge” by rejecting the opposing counsel’s challenge.194 
Chamallas argues that this finding could apply with equal force 
to the admission of minority-based expert testimony.195 She 
claims that when the court admits minority-based expert 
testimony, “it tells the jury that race or sex is a legally 
permissible criterion.”196  
Chamallas’s argument ignores the fact-intensive nature of 
the state action determination and the heavy emphasis the 
Edmonson Court placed on the procedural control a court has 
over the entire jury selection process.197 In Edmonson, the Court 
spent four long paragraphs discussing the extent to which the 
                                                                                                     
 191.  See id. (explaining that the peremptory challenges and juror selection 
in a civil trial would not be possible without assistance from the court). 
 192.  Id. at 622–23.  
 193.  See id. at 623 (“The trial judge exercises substantial control over voir 
dire in the federal system. . . . In some cases, judges may even conduct the 
entire voir dire by themselves.”). 
 194.  See id. at 624 (explaining that participation by the judge in peremptory 
challenges is “direct and indispensable” and thus “involve[s] itself with invidious 
discrimination” when it allows a discriminatory peremptory strike to occur).  
 195.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 108 (premising the argument on the 
fact the “state creates the evidentiary rules” and so becomes a “party to the act” 
of using minority-based statistics). 
 196.  Id.  
 197.  See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text (examining the state’s 
indispensability to juror selection as discussed in Edmonson). 
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entire juror selection process depends on the court system.198 The 
procedural power the court has over the jury is immense and 
courts have both a right and a duty to manage jury procedure.199 
Given this codependent relationship between the jury and the 
court, it is not surprising that the court would find private actors 
participating in jury selection constitutes state action.200 An 
expert’s testimony is extremely different from peremptory strikes 
in this way. Peremptory strikes are meant to “assist the 
government in the selection of an impartial trier of fact.”201 
Peremptory strikes are essential to a procedure over which the 
state has absolute control, and thus, the private actor exercising 
the peremptory strikes is subject to control as well.202 
 Expert testimony, on the other hand, merely sets forth one 
piece of evidence from which the jury—the “quintessential 
governmental body”203—may consider.204 Chamallas argues that, 
when a judge admits expert testimony based on minority-based 
statistics, they are clearly a participant in the discriminatory 
action.205 She contends that the judge is “placing its power, 
                                                                                                     
 198.  See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622–24 (1991) 
(laying out the various procedures over which the court controls the jury 
selection process). 
 199.  See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text (noting that a court 
controls the way jurors are selected, how questions are asked, and selects 
sanctions for individuals shirking jury duty). 
 200.  See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620 (“Although the conduct of private 
parties lies beyond the Constitution’s scope in most instances, governmental 
authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must 
be deemed to act within the authority of the government and, as a result, be 
subject to constitutional constraints.”). 
 201.  Id. at 620.  
 202.  See id. at 624 (“As we have outlined here, a private party could not 
exercise its peremptory challenges absent the overt, significant assistance of the 
court.”). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Experts are meant only to assist the factfinder in adjudication. See FED. 
R. EVID. 702 notes of advisory committee on proposed rules (“The rule 
accordingly recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or 
exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier 
of fact to apply them to the facts.”). 
 205.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 108–09 (arguing that a judge who 
overrules an objection to evidence based on minority-based statistics 
participates in discriminatory action). 
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property and prestige behind the alleged discrimination”206 more 
overtly than a judge who allows discriminatory peremptory 
strikes.207 
Chamallas’s argument, however, misinterprets Edmonson’s 
mention of the judge’s participation in “invidious 
discrimination.”208 Edmonson focused on the judge’s action 
because the judge’s act was indispensable to the private actor’s 
use of the peremptory strike itself.209 In such a case, the private 
actor—the defendant’s attorney—had to extensively rely on the 
government to use discriminatory peremptory strikes.210 Expert 
testimony does not rely on governmental assistance to the same 
extent that private parties exercising peremptory challenges do. 
The majority of the information that experts offer come from 
external sources,211 and juries do not rely solely on the court to 
judge an expert witness.212 Further, the court does not control the 
extent of the expert’s testimony, and so the expert’s action is not 
saddled with the absolute control that jury determination is.213 
                                                                                                     
 206.  Id. at 108 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 
624 (1991)). 
 207.  See id. (“[B]ecause the jury may well witness the exchange between the 
objecting counsel and the court when admission of expert testimony is 
challenged, this could be argued to present a stronger case than Edmonson for a 
finding of state action.”) 
 208.  Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624. 
 209.  See id. (explaining how the private actor “invokes the formal authority 
of the court” and would be unable to act at all without the “overt, significant 
assistance of the court”). 
 210.  See id. at 623 (emphasizing the requirement that a private party rely 
significantly on assistance from the court). 
 211.  See supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text (explaining that an 
expert must bring external knowledge or experience independent of a court’s 
endorsement). 
 212.  See Caroline T. Parrott et al., Differences in Expert Witness Knowledge: 
Do Mock Jurors Notice and Does It Matter?, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 69, 
69 (2015) (“Contrary to the hypotheses that high knowledge would yield 
increased credibility and agreement, knowledge manipulations influenced only 
perceived expert likeability. The low-knowledge expert was perceived as more 
likeable than the high-knowledge counterpart, a paradoxical finding.”). 
 213.  While the court does serve as a “gatekeeper” of expert testimony, it does 
not dictate the content outside traditional admissibility determinations. See 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules (“When 
opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore 
superfluous and a waste of time.”). 
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Experts also conduct minority-based determinations outside of 
the court setting in purely private matters.214 This completely 
private nature distinguishes from Edmonson, where “peremptory 
challenges have no utility outside the jury system, a system 
which the government alone administers.”215  
b. In Testifying, Experts Are Not Performing a Function 
Traditionally in the Hands of the Government 
These factors also come into play regarding the Edmonson 
Court’s second consideration—whether the actor is performing a 
function traditionally in the hands of the government.216 
Chamallas maintains that expert testimony meets this 
consideration because “the court’s acceptance of an expert’s use of 
race-based or gender-based data is inseparable from its 
determination of substantive law and as such is appropriately 
viewed as a traditional governmental function.”217 Chamallas 
reframed the question by stating “the focus should be on whether 
judicial admission of discriminatory expert testimony constitutes 
state action.”218 
Chamallas appears, however, to be applying the doctrine to 
the wrong party. The question in Edmonson was whether, in 
issuing discriminatory strikes, the private litigant partook in 
discriminatory state action.219 Edmonson focused on the fact that 
                                                                                                     
 214.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 107 (admitting that experts utilize 
“economic projections of future earning capacity” outside the courtroom “in 
settlement negotiations and in a wide variety of financial transactions”). 
 215.  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624–26 (1991). 
 216.  See id. at 624 (explaining that because the “jury exercises the power of 
the court,” acts as “principal factfinder,” weighs evidence, and reaches a verdict, 
the jury is performing a traditional government function, and choosing the jury 
is as well); see also Marsh v. Alabama, 323 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (“[T]he owners 
of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads. . . . are built and 
operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a 
public function.”). 
 217.  Chamallas, supra note 31, at 109. 
 218.  Id.  
 219.  See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619 (“Racial discrimination, though 
invidious in all contexts, violates the Constitution only when it may be 
attributed to state action. . . . Thus, the legality of the exclusion at issue here 
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the private actor was helping to select “a quintessential 
government body,”220 explaining that where “a government 
confers on a private body the power to choose the government’s 
employees or officials, the private body will be bound by the 
constitutional mandate of race neutrality.”221 The Court focused 
on the delegation of a traditionally government act—the 
“appointment” of a governmental body.222 Thus, the private actor 
himself was performing a traditional government function.223 
Chamallas attempts to avoid this problem by explaining that the 
admission of expert testimony is “intricately connected to choice 
of the governing legal standard.”224 But providing evidence for a 
legal standard is not the same as appointing a government actor 
in a non-public election. Her analysis also impermissibly moves 
away from the action of the private actor—the expert—to that of 
the governmental actor—the judge. 
c. The Adversarial Nature of Adjudication Ensures Mitigation of 
Potential Injury 
The final factor is whether the injury is uniquely aggravated 
by government authority.225 Chamallas makes the valid point, 
based on Edmonson, that discrimination in a courtroom is 
particularly harmful.226 When a court admits minority-based 
expert evaluations, it can compound the injury that invidious 
                                                                                                     
turns on the extent to which a litigant in a civil case may be subject to the 
Constitution’s restrictions.”). 
 220.  Id. at 624. 
 221.  Id. at 625. 
 222.  See id. at 626 (expanding on precedent to find that, except for public 
elections, appointment of a governmental body constitutes state action, even if 
delegated to private individuals). 
 223.  See id (“Though the motive of a peremptory challenge may be to protect 
a private interest, the objective of jury selection proceedings is to determine 
representation of a on a government body.”). 
 224.  Chamallas, supra note 31, at 109. 
 225.  See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) 
(noting the severe nature of racial discrimination in the courtroom setting). 
 226.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 110 (“Few places are a more real 
expression of the constitutional authority of the government then a courtroom, 
where the law itself unfolds.”). 
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discrimination causes.227 Yet, as Chamallas herself admits, the 
private status of the expert protects against such an injury.228 
Juries know that experts are paid witnesses and “can be 
instructed that the substance of the expert’s testimony does not 
represent the views of the court.”229 Further, the opposing side is 
free to counter the expert’s findings and offer expert testimony of 
its own.230 Chamallas admits that Edmonson is easy to 
implement while monitoring experts could be difficult.231 She 
ultimately reasons, however, that such concerns are unfounded 
and that an expert’s use of minority-based statistics is state 
action.232 She argues that admitting minority-based statistics “is 
much more likely to affect the outcome of a case.”233 But this 
argument ignores the adversarial nature of civil cases.234 While 
minority-based expert valuations can affect the outcome, the 
other party will offer alternatives and attempt to undermine 
those valuations.235 Thus, the likelihood that the injury will be 
compounded because it is in court is actually lessened in the 
presence of the adversarial system.236 Chamallas also contends 
that the symbolic value of minority-neutral is extremely 
                                                                                                     
 227.  See id. (explaining that race discrimination is particularly harmful). 
 228.  See id. (noting the formal arguments against finding state action and 
distinguishing Edmonson). 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1120 
(1991) (“[F]or over two-thirds of the appearances by expert witnesses, there 
were opposing experts in the same general area.”). 
 231.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 110 (finding prudential arguments 
could encourage a finding of no state action where experts use minority-based 
statistics). 
 232.  See id. (“On both formal and prudential grounds, however, I believe the 
case for finding state action is strong.”). 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (explaining the importance 
of adverseness “which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court 
so largely depends”). 
 235.  See Gross, supra note 230, at 1120 (explaining that, in a study about 
expert use in trials, “most expert witnesses were disputed by similar experts for 
the opposing side, and most juries had to resolve such disputes”). 
 236.  See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (“The system assumes 
that adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and 
fairness.”). 
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important because otherwise “it inscribes a rule of decision that 
systematically undervalues the potential of women and 
minorities.”237 While there is some truth to that statement, the 
adversarial nature of adjudication and the jury’s knowledge that 
the expert is a private, paid witness, balances out such 
systematic undervaluation.238  
B. The Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection Clause prevents any state from 
“deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”239 It requires states to afford all 
individuals the same treatment under the law.240 The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly found that race is a suspect class, and so 
race-based discrimination must pass strict scrutiny to be 
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.241 Strict 
scrutiny requires that the race-based classification be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest by the least 
restrictive means possible.242 Gender is a quasi-suspect class, and 
so cases involving gender discrimination require the government 
action to pass intermediate scrutiny.243 Intermediate scrutiny 
                                                                                                     
 237.  Id. 
 238.  See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“[O]ur legal tradition 
regards the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and 
minimizing risk of error.”). 
 239.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 240.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“The central 
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”). 
 241. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) 
(“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to . . . assur[e] that the legislative body is 
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. . . . 
[and] ensures that the means chosen “fit” this compelling goal . . . .”); Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail 
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to 
say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that the courts 
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”).  
 242.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“[S]uch 
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further 
compelling governmental interests.”).  
 243.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–33 (1996) (finding that 
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requires the government action to be substantially related to 
important government interests.244 The use of race- and ethnicity-
based statistics will need to pass strict scrutiny, while gender-
based statistics must pass intermediate scrutiny.245  
Chamallas examines the equal protection claim and 
concludes that minority-based statistics would fail even 
intermediate scrutiny.246 In determining whether government 
action violates equal protection under either strict scrutiny or 
immediate scrutiny, the governmental interest must be weighed 
against the level of discrimination imposed upon an individual.247 
The governmental interest is in properly adjudicating cases and 
ensuring realistic damage awards.248 The state has an important 
interest in just and accurate adjudication.249 Minority-based 
statistics can limit uncertainty and ensure that an accurate 
damage award is given.250 The state also has an important 
interest in efficient resolution of cases, and statistics can help 
                                                                                                     
the government must show “exceedingly persuasive justification” for any 
gender-based action, but that strict scrutiny is not required). 
 244.  See id. at 524 (“To succeed, the defender of the challenged action must 
show ‘at least that the classification serves important governmental objectives 
and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.’” (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718 (1982))). 
 245.  See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“Equal protection in this context demands that the claimant not be subjected to 
a disadvantageous life expectancy estimate solely on the basis of a ‘racial’ 
classification.”). 
 246.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 117 (arguing that gender-based data 
should be considered the same as race-based data, but that the equal protection 
clause nonetheless prevents the use of either). 
 247.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (explaining that when 
the government acts by drawing distinctions, the interest individuals have in 
not being discriminated against must be weighed against the state’s objective). 
 248.  See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying discussion (discussing how 
statistics are important in removing uncertainty in future lost earning 
determinations). 
 249.  See David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for 
Indigents in Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 281, 337–38 (1990) (“[T]he 
government has an interest in just adjudication of its citizens’ claims.”). 
 250.  See supra note 64 (noting cases that have used minority-based 
Department of Labor statistics). 
244 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 206 (2016) 
limit the contours of damages.251 This interest, however, is not 
extremely strong where the government seeks to draw 
distinctions based on race.252 As Chamallas maintained: 
It is not possible to anticipate every possible argument the 
government may make to justify such classifications, but the 
Court’s refusal (since the World War II Japanese internment 
cases) to uphold any racial classification which burdens 
minority members or appears to have a stigmatizing effect 
would lead one to believe that few governmental interests, 
other than a possible interest in protection of human life, could 
justify any use of such classifications.253 
The Equal Protection Clause thus sets a high bar for any act that 
draws race-based distinctions.254  
While the level of scrutiny is not as stringent for gender-
based statistics, a similar argument can be made that the 
government interest is not strong enough to justify such 
discrimination.255 As Chamallas states: “The use of gender-based 
projections are premised upon highly contested cultural 
assumptions. Imbedded in the projections of shorter worklife 
expectancy for women is the presumption that all women will 
interrupt their careers for a substantial period of time for the 
purpose of child-rearing.”256 This does not mean, however, that a 
court must automatically find an equal protection violation if 
                                                                                                     
 251.  See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) 
(noting the “judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution 
of controversies”). 
 252.  See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (“Indeed, two members of this Court have 
already stated that they ‘cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which 
makes the color of a person’s skin the test . . . .’” (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 
379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964))); see also G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 152 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that relying on race- and ethnicity-based statistics 
“subjects the claimant to a ‘disadvantageous estimate’ of damages ‘solely on the 
basis’ or ethnic classification” (citing Chamallas, supra note 31, at 75)). 
 253.  Chamallas, supra note 31, at 112 (citing JOHN E. NOVAK & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 630 n.119 (4th ed. 1991)). 
 254.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (explaining that 
equal protection requires scrutiny of governmental action because equal 
treatment is core feature of the United States).  
 255.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 122 (arguing that gender-based 
statistics reinforce current biases). 
 256.  Id. 
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expert testimony uses minority-based statistics.257 The 
government is not creating the distinctions but merely reporting 
and allowing experts to utilize them.258  
Chamallas argues that Palmore v. Sidoti259 foreclosed any 
such argument “that reliance on race-based data is 
nondiscriminatory because it merely reflects the reality of a 
racially stratified workplace.”260 Palmore considered whether the 
lower court was justified when it removed a white mother’s 
custody rights because of potential biases her child could face 
growing up with a black step-father.261 The Court concluded that 
such action by the lower court was impermissible.262 The 
individual interest at stake was the removal of an “infant child 
from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate 
person to have such custody.”263 While not completely dispositive, 
the court did ask the question of whether the interest in racial 
harmony can possibly outweigh the interest a mother has in the 
custody of her child.264 Unlike damages in a tort case, the 
deprivation of parental rights is one of the strongest private 
interests in this country.265 Further, when minority-based 
statistics are used in a courtroom, the nature of the adversarial 
                                                                                                     
 257.  See id. at 118 (noting that biological differences between men and 
women often result in “relaxed scrutiny”). 
 258.  See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BULBICK, supra note 101, at § 479 (“Calculations 
traditionally take into account life expectancy and expected earnings. Mortality 
tables are often admitted for this purpose.”). 
 259.  See generally 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (examining whether a court could 
remove a white mother’s custody rights given potential biases her child could 
face from growing up with a black step-father, and concluding that such action 
was impermissible). 
 260.  Chamallas, supra note 31, at 114–15. 
 261.  See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 430–31 (setting out the issue of the case). 
 262.  See id. at 434 (concluding that, even if there were negative effects of 
growing up in a biracial home, a court cannot remove a child from a fit parent). 
 263.  Id. at 434. 
 264.  See id. at 433 (“The question, however, is whether the reality of private 
biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations 
for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother.”). 
 265.  See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (“[I]t [is] plain 
beyond the need for multiple citation that a natural parent’s desire for and right 
to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children is 
an interest far more precious than any property right.” (citation omitted)). 
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process makes the interest at stake much less immediate and 
important.266  
C. Due Process Clause 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law.”267 This clause 
provides for both procedural and substantive due process.268 
These two separate doctrines vary considerably. Procedural due 
process is concerned with ensuring “a number of the procedural 
protections contained in the Bill of Rights.”269 Substantive due 
process is a doctrine that protects “liberty interests” from being 
infringed.270 This doctrine, however, is extremely controversial.271 
The Supreme Court at one time included economic interests 
within substantive due process, but has since abandoned the 
doctrine.272 In Kimpson, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s 
due process rights would be violated if the expert used minority-
based statistics, but did not elaborate on the exact nature of the 
                                                                                                     
 266.  See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) 
(“[O]ur adversary system presupposes, [that] accurate and just results are most 
likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests.”).  
 267.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 268.  See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (stating that “the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers both substantive and 
procedural rights”).  
 269.  Id.  
 270.  See id. at 269–72 (noting that substantive due process typically has 
been used for “marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity” 
and the “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are 
scarce and open-ended” (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 
(1992))). 
 271.  See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power 
Through Substantive Due Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 521 (2008) (“Substantive 
due process is one of the most confusing and most controversial areas of 
constitutional law.”). 
 272.  See Alexandra Klein, Note, The Freedom to Pursue a Common Calling: 
Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Occupational Licensing Statutes, 73 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 411, 422–27 (2016) (explaining Lochner and the Supreme Court’s 
abandonment of economic due process). 
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violation.273 This Note therefore will examine justifications under 
both procedural and substantive due process. 
1. Procedural Due Process 
Kimpson put forth the argument that compensation in a tort 
case constitutes a property right.274 It concluded that using 
minority-based statistics results in denial of a plaintiff’s property 
right through “arbitrary and irrational state action.”275 
Procedural due process, however, allows the state to remove 
property so long as proper procedures are met.276 In Mathews v. 
Eldridge,277 the Court explained that when property is taken, the 
court must weigh three factors: (1) the private interest; (2) the 
government’s interest; and (3) the risk of property deprivation 
under the current procedure and the value of procedural 
safeguards.278 Full adjudication, however, is the hearing which all 
others aspire to.279 Minority-based statistics are offered to the 
factfinder, and the factfinder determines whether they should 
apply during a full trial.280 During trial, the factfinder examines 
the varying interests at stake, and fully adjudicates the issue of 
damages.281 Procedural due process does not guarantee a perfect 
                                                                                                     
 273.  See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(noting that the use of minority-based statistics is “arbitrary and irrational state 
action” resulting in a “denial of due process”). 
 274.  See id. (“There is a right—in effect a property right—to compensation 
in cases of negligently caused damage to the person under state and federal 
law.”). 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  See 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (explaining that “some form of hearing is 
required before an individual is finally deprived of property”). 
 277.  Id. at 333. 
 278.  See id. at 335 (setting out the three factors).  
 279.  Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266–67 (1970) (finding that 
although procedural due process is due before termination of welfare benefits, 
the hearing need not take the form of a judicial trial). 
 280.  See FED. R. EVID. 702 notes of advisory committee on proposed rules 
(clarifying that experts are simply meant to assist the factfinder). 
 281.  See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267, 270–71 (explaining that procedural due 
process requires the opportunity to be heard, the right to confront witnesses, 
and reasons for the ultimate determination). 
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result, but guarantees that an individual is not unjustly deprived 
of property without proper procedures.282 Because the jury will 
fully examine the contested issue of damages, the ultimate 
adjudication is not arbitrary.283 In cases like Gary’s, where his 
parents both held higher degrees, it is unlikely that factfinders 
would consider the generic more likely than the individualized.284 
Where individual information is compelling, there is little need 
for generic statistics and judges can and have discounted them in 
such cases.285 Thus, procedural due process is not implicated, 
because the process protects against “arbitrary and irrational 
state action.”286  
2. Substantive Due Process 
Substantive due process is a questionable doctrine that 
“protects individual’s liberty against ‘certain government actions 
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used against 
                                                                                                     
 282.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“This Court 
consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual 
is finally deprived of a property interest.”). 
 283.  Although jury determinations are kept secret, the fact that juries are 
presented with alternative amounts from both sides ensures that the ultimate 
result is not arbitrary. So long as we trust juries to weigh properly presented 
evidence in uncertain future damages they should be trusted to use statistics 
when the individualized information is lacking. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 
116 F.3d 606, 619 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The jury system incorporated in our 
Constitution by the Framers was not intended to satisfy yearnings for perfect 
knowledge of how a verdict is reached, . . . The jury as we know it is supposed to 
reach its decisions in the mystery and security of secrecy.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 284.  See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“[F]or the purposes of projecting damages, the specific characteristics of the 
child and his family, rather than the characterization of the child as a member 
of a particular ethnic group, must be used in determining damages.”). 
 285.  See Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1580, 1585 (S.D. Ga. 
1996) (giving “limited credibility” to expert determinations based on “little more 
than speculation” and favoring the evidence of temperament and family bonds). 
 286.  See Arbitrary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[F]ounded on 
prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact.”); Irrational, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Not guided by reason or by a fair consideration of 
the facts.”). 
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them.’”287 To find a substantive due process violation, a 
fundamental liberty interest must be identified that is “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”288 That does not 
mean, however, that the liberty interest must appear in the Bill 
or Rights or have been considered a liberty interest when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.289  
When experts use minority-based statistics, it arguably robs 
individuals of their potential.290 When a child like Gary is injured, 
minority-based statistics unfairly bind the child to a future that 
fails to account for his individual characteristics.291 The argument 
could be made that individuals have a fundamental liberty 
interest in charting their own course in life and a fundamental 
liberty interest in future potential.292 This route could potentially 
lead to a substantive due process violation, because minority-
based statistics shackle the child to the future of his racial or 
ethnic group.293  
This argument, however, ultimately falls short. As discussed 
above, the procedural protections in place help to ensure that the 
individual is not shackled to their racial or ethnic group.294 The 
Supreme Court has also been hesitant to invoke substantive due 
                                                                                                     
 287.  Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). 
 288. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 289.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1992) 
(explaining that liberty interests arise out of a “realm of personal liberty” and 
certain liberty interests such as marriage do not have a textual or historical 
basis). 
 290.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 115 (“Looked at from an 
individualistic perspective, the use of race-based data unfairly ties an individual 
to the track record of his or her racial group.”). 
 291.  See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“Economic data that is minority-specific saddles those who do not conform to 
the data with adverse generalizations about their group.”). 
 292.  See Greenberg, supra note 30, at 429 (“Using race-based statistics 
reinforces the current racial discrimination in the workforce, ignoring the 
possibility and the social value of upward mobility.”). 
 293.  See id. at 450 (“The subjective data relies on the assumption that an 
individual’s achievement is limited by her genetic inheritance.”). 
 294.  See supra notes 283–286 and accompanying text (arguing that because 
factfinders consider individual factors as well as minority-based statistics the 
determination is not arbitrary). 
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process in recent years.295 The Court has simply stated that 
“deprivation of the liberty of a person” is unconstitutional.296 But 
liberty interests have traditionally been found in more concrete 
and clearly defined categories.297 For example, the deprivation of 
the right to marry,298 the right to control the upbringing of one’s 
children,299 and the right to procreate.300 It is unlikely that such 
an amorphous liberty interest—the right to chart one’s own 
course in life—is “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history,” given the 
inexact nature of such a concept.301 Further, as stated above, 
future lost earning calculations are “necessarily speculative.”302 
By using minority-based statistics, along with individual factors, 
the expert is attempting to approximate a course in life that will 
not be taken.303 Because of this, the expert is arguably attempting 
to help navigate the injured person’s future potential. Moreover, 
even if there is such an uncertain liberty interest, it is violated 
when the injury occurred, not during the damage determination.  
                                                                                                     
 295.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority never utters the dread words ‘substantive due 
process,’ perhaps sensing the disrepute into which the doctrine has fallen.”). 
 296.  Id. at 2695. 
 297.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992) (noting that 
substantive due process, while not limited to these categories, has traditionally 
been found for marriage, procreation, child rearing and education, family 
relationships, and contraception). 
 298.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“[T]he 
right to marry is fundamental.”). 
 299.  See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents 
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”). 
 300.  See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage and 
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”). 
 301.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997) (explaining that 
broad right to personal autonomy is not a fundamental liberty interest and the 
Court must look at the exact asserted right). 
 302.  Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1578, (S.D. Ga. 1996). 
 303.  See supra Part II (“Because damage awards are meant to compensate 
the plaintiff in a close approximation of actual damages on an individual basis, 
experts must be able to utilize relevant available data.”). 
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V. A Statutory Alternative to a Constitutional Bar Is Proper 
Under Congress’s Commerce Power 
Given the tenuous finding of state action when experts use 
minority-based statistics, the use of such statistics is 
constitutional.304 Despite the lack of state action, the government 
could pass legislation prohibiting the use of minority-based 
statistics under Congress’s commerce power.305 The use is not 
limited to one expert in one case, but concerns influences across 
the entire United States and so arguably concerns interstate 
commerce.306 If Congress could not proscribe individual experts’ 
use of minority-based statistics, it would undermine the purpose 
of preventing experts from causing discriminatory affects across 
the country.307 
A. Congress’s Commerce Power is Broad Enough to Legislate 
Experts 
The Commerce Clause308 allows Congress to regulate 
commerce that affects interstate activities.309 In Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States,310 the Supreme Court stated that Title II 
of the Civil Rights Act311 was within Congress’s commerce power 
                                                                                                     
 304.  See supra Part IV.B (explaining that state action is unlikely in a case of 
private litigants hiring private experts to determine lost future earnings in civil 
proceedings). 
 305.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (concluding that 
Congress may regulate activity that “‘substantially affects’ interstate 
commerce”). 
 306.  See infra Part V.A (arguing that Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests 
damage awards has a substantial affect on interstate commerce within the 
modern restrictive framework). 
 307.  Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (finding that it was within 
Congress’s power to regulate marijuana across state lines, and Congress’ 
purpose would be frustrated if it could not regulate marijuana grown by an 
individual person in one state). 
 308.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 309.  See id. (giving Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes”). 
 310.  379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 311.  42 U.S.C. § 20000a (2012) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and 
equal enjoyment of the . . . accommodations of any place of public 
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as applied to a single motel refusing to serve to African 
Americans.312 “The only questions are (1) whether Congress had a 
rational basis for finding racial discrimination, . . . and (2) if it 
had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that 
evil are reasonable and appropriate.”313 If Congress were to pass 
legislation prohibiting the use of minority-based statistics, it 
would arguably be within the commerce power.314 Not only are 
the minority-based statistics compiled nationally, but the effects 
of their use in individual tort cases have much broader impacts. 
Tort cases are brought throughout the country, and if some states 
allow minority-based statistics while others do not it could lead to 
widely disparate awards resulting in an effect on plaintiffs and 
defendants.315 In lead-based paint cases, eliminating disparate 
awards based on race, ethnicity, and gender encourages removal 
of lead-based paint in houses.316 It creates an incentive to achieve 
compliance. 
All individual tort cases in the U.S. create an aggregate 
affect on interstate commerce.317 In Gonzales v. Raich,318 the 
Court examined the question of whether the federal government 
                                                                                                     
accommodation . . . without discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, 
or national origin.”). 
 312.  See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250 (finding the statute within 
commerce power). 
 313.  Id. at 258.  
 314.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (noting that 
regulations of interstate activities have come under the Commerce Clause when 
it involves “economic enterprise”). 
 315.  Compare G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(removing ability of experts to use minority-based statistics), with Boucher v. 
U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1996) (allowing expert to use 
minority-based tables). 
 316.  Cf. McCarthy, supra note 54, at 81 (“Th[e] widespread social and 
economic disparity is perpetuated, perhaps widened, when these same children, 
who live among lead paint hazards largely as a result of the latent racism in 
American culture, are then denied full compensation when these hazards injure 
them.”). 
 317.  See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (finding that when 
individual action could in the aggregate affect interstate commerce, Congress 
could regulate it). But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (“Wickard . . . is perhaps the 
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate 
activity.”). 
 318.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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could regulate purely local cultivation of medical marijuana 
pursuant the Commerce Clause.319 The Court explained that the 
Commerce Clause test does not require a determination that an 
individual’s “activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially 
affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational 
basis’ exists for so finding.”320 Thus, if there is a rational basis for 
finding that experts’ reliance on minority-based statistics affects 
interstate commerce, Congress may regulate or prohibit this 
reliance.321 Rational basis is an extremely low bar, and courts are 
regularly deferential to legislative findings.322 Because an 
expert’s use of minority-based statistics affects damage 
calculations, the aggregate impact and national character of the 
statistics has a direct effect on interstate commerce.323 Further, if 
their use results in lower damages for minorities and women, 
individuals—particularly children—“will continue to be 
inadequately compensated” for injuries.324 Because minorities will 
be inadequately compensated, their valuation as “worth less” 
than their non-minority counterparts will continue to permeate 
the national economy.325 These reasons serve as a “rational basis” 
for finding that an expert’s use of minority-based statistics has an 
effect on interstate commerce. 
                                                                                                     
 319.  See id. at 5 (presenting the issue up for consideration). 
 320.  Id. at 22. 
 321.  See id. at 25–26 (distinguishing from Lopez because regulation of 
marijuana is “quintessentially economic”). 
 322.  See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) 
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of economic enterprise”). 
 324.  See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(explaining that, if alternatives are not used, lead-poisoned children will face 
unfair compensation purely based on their race or ethnicity). 
 325.  See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 112 (“Racial classifications . . . 
produce harmful results, stigmatizing minorities as inferior and inflicting 
cumulative burdens on those groups in society who are subjected to pervasive 
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B. A Fair Experts Act Will Act to Prevent the Use of 
Minority-Based Statistics in Damage Calculations 
Given these considerations, Congress could pass legislation, a 
Fair Experts Act, prohibiting experts from using minority-based 
statistics. This alternative would prevent the use of 
discriminatory statistics while avoiding state action problems 
that arise under the Constitution.326 The best alternative is to 
require that experts use minority-neutral statistics.327 Simply 
removing statistics from the equation or using geographical 
statistics can reinforce socioeconomic biases and fail to account 
for individual potential.328 The statute should ensure that all 
expert witnesses disclose their methodology and use neutral data. 
A draft of a statute follows: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education to testify as to damages and 
lost future earnings must use minority-neutral statistics. Such 
statistics are to be used to supplement individual determinations. 
For the purpose of this section—“minority-neutral statistics” are 
statistics equivalent to the national average as set forth by the 
United States Department of Labor.329 
This statute would give “a reasonable benchmark to follow in 
assessing damages.”330 While Congress could pass or alter 
legislation governing the statistics themselves to remove race, 
                                                                                                     
 326.  See supra Part IV.A (arguing that an expert’s use of minority-based 
statistics is not state action). 
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ethnicity, and gender from its findings, this alternative ignores 
the benefit statistics can offer outside of the courthouse.331 
C. The Lead Contaminated Tap Water in Flint, Michigan, Offers a 
Strong Case for Statutory Limitations on Experts’ Use of 
Minority-Based Statistics. 
In 2014, Flint, Michigan, switched the water supply to 
residents from Lake Huron to the Flint River.332 Strapped for 
cash, the city of Flint decided that it could save money by no 
longer paying Detroit for water.333 Soon after the switch, 
however, the tap water began to change, exhibiting a brown color 
accompanying strange tastes and smells.334 City officials assured 
residents that there was nothing to worry about, and for almost 
two years residents paid the city for the tap water from the Flint 
River.335 In August of 2015, a group of researchers “came up and 
did in-home testing and found elevated levels of lead in the 
drinking water.”336 It turned out that the water from the Flint 
River was corrosive and was eating away at lead service pipes.337 
Despite the investigation, City officials continued denying any 
                                                                                                     
 331.  For example, Kimpson noted that such statistics can be used when 
determining life expectancy for juveniles facing long prison sentences. See 
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 336.  Id. 
 337.  See id. (explaining the source of lead in Flint tap water). 
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problems, until one pediatrician investigated and found 
extremely high levels of lead in the blood of toddlers.338  
Several individuals have filed suit, claiming that Flint failed 
to follow federal law and that officials knew of the problem but 
failed to notify city residents.339 Residents are suing because lead 
poisoned children “may have suffered irreversible damage to their 
developing brains and nervous systems.”340 The population of 
Flint is predominantly African-American; in 2010 56.6% of the 
population was Black, and 37.4% was white.341 The population is 
also predominantly lower income with a median household 
income of $24,834.342 If minority-based statistics are used, the 
children of Flint will receive disparate awards regardless of the 
fact that the injuries are identical and they all live in the same 
city.343 If the proposed statute were applied, however, the 
individualized information would be supplemented by 
minority-neutral statistics based on the national average. This 
would ensure more equivalent outcomes. Applying the statute 
would also ensure that children born in Flint are not undervalued 
because of where they were born. Using statistics based on a 
national average avoids “the possible perpetuation of 
inappropriate stereotypes, especially where the defendants have 
deprived their victims of the chance to excel in life beyond 
predicted statistical averages.”344 If, instead of the proposed 
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statute, minority-based statistics were found unconstitutional, 
lower socioeconomic status would always result in lower damage 
awards. This is because “the United States Constitution includes 
no express protection of socioeconomic rights. Nor has the U.S. 
Supreme Court either deemed such rights fundamental for 
purposes of review under the Constitution nor found poverty to be 
a classification, like race, that deserves searching equal-
protection analysis.”345 Yet just as race can “unfairly tie[] an 
individual to the track record of his or her racial group,” so too 
can a socioeconomic group.346 The proposed statute would 
eliminate minority-based statistics and attempt to compensate 
individuals for their lost potential—as far as money can. 
VI. Conclusion 
The use of minority-based statistics is unreliable and 
inherently problematic. When experts use such statistics, it is 
unlikely to result in accurate figures and fails to account for the 
uncertainties in life. As one court so aptly put it: 
Any one of us who has attended a 40th, or even 50th, reunion 
of a grade school or high school or college class can attest to 
the unpredictability of life. Some of the most charismatic and 
promising of our then colleagues died young, or suffered long 
illness or suffered through other unfortunate and unhappy 
events. Others, perhaps even those deemed least likely to 
succeed, have led rather successful, apparently useful 
lives. Very few members of the human race in our great 
country, whether male or female, white or black or yellow, of 
whatever ethnic composition, escape the unpredictable 
vagaries of life. Life’s cup is both half empty and half full.347 
Because of the uncertainty of life, many experts have relied 
on minority-based statistics as a way to ensure a more realistic 
and appropriate number. These statistics, however, fail to 
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account for the “unpredictable vagaries of life” and can lead to 
inadequate compensation by limiting individual potential. 
Yet, the fact that these statistics are unreliable does not 
mean they are unconstitutional. Experts use these statistics on 
behalf of the plaintiff or the defendant, the other side is able to 
rebut the evidence, and it is up to the factfinder to decide if the 
numbers properly account for the uncertainty inherent in future 
predictions. The court need not endorse the expert’s calculation so 
long as it is based on “sufficient facts or data.”348 The argument 
that this constitutes state action is questionable at best. 
That does not mean, however, that experts should continue 
to use minority-based statistics. It is well within Congress’s 
power to regulate private individuals when there are interstate 
effects. By passing a Fair Experts Act, Congress can ensure that 
experts do not use minority-based statistics. It will ensure that 
individuals are not bound by the effects of past discrimination 
while accounting for the potential children have to overcome the 
odds. Courts must be cautious about intruding on the domain of 
the political branches. While it is tempting for courts to “legislate 
from the bench,” our country is a democracy, and lawmaking is 
more properly left to Congress. Through Congress, past injustice 
need not influence the recovery of individuals injured—often 
through no fault of their own—and can close the gap towards 
making them whole.  
 
                                                                                                     
 348.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
